Libertarians have given considerable thought to refining their basic=20
principles and their vision of a libertarian society. But they have =
given=20
virtually no thought to a vitally important question, that of strategy: =
now that=20
we know the nature of our social goal, how in the world do we get =
there?
To the extent that libertarians have thought at all about strategy, =
it has=20
simply been to adopt what I have called "educationism": namely, that =
actions=20
rest upon ideas, and therefore that libertarians must try to convert =
people to=20
their ideas by issuing books, pamphlets, articles, lectures, etc. Now, =
it is=20
certainly true that actions depend upon ideas, and that education in =
libertarian=20
ideas is an important and necessary part in converting people to liberty =
and in=20
effecting social change. But such an insight is only the =
beginning of=20
arriving at a libertarian strategy; there is a great deal more that =
needs to be=20
said.
In the first place, ideas do not spread and advance by themselves in =
a social=20
vacuum; they must be adopted and spread by people, people who =
must be=20
convinced of and committed to the progress of liberty. But this means =
that=20
liberty can advance only by means of a developing libertarian =
movement.=20
We must therefore be concerned not only with the ideology, but also with =
developing the people to carry the principles forward. Webster's =
defines=20
"movement" in a way clearly relevant to our concerns:
Some libertarians have criticized the very concept of "movement" as=20
"collectivist", as somehow violating the principles of individualism. =
But it=20
should be clear that there is nothing in the least collectivist in =
individuals=20
voluntarily joining together for the advancement of common goals. A =
libertarian=20
movement is no more "collectivist" than a corporation, a bridge club, or =
any=20
other organization; it is curious that some libertarians, while =
conceding the=20
merits of all other such "collective" organizations, balk only at one =
that would=20
advance the cause of liberty itself.
Neither does joining a movement mean that the joiner must in some way =
submerge his individual sovereignty to the movement or the organization, =
any=20
more than the bridge club member must submerge his individuality in =
order to=20
advance the playing of bridge. The individual libertarian, who places =
the=20
triumph of liberty high on his value scale, decides to join a movement =
that is=20
requisite to the achievement of his goal, just as does the member of a =
bridge=20
club or the investor in a steel-manufacturing corporation.
If the advancement of liberty requires a movement as well as a body =
of ideas,=20
it is our contention that the overriding goal of a libertarian movement =
must be=20
the victory of liberty in the real world, the bringing of the =
ideal into=20
actuality. This may seem a truism, but unfortunately many libertarians =
have=20
failed to see the importance of victory as the ultimate and overriding =
goal.
But why should libertarians not adopt what might seem to be a=20
self-evident goal? One reason for not making such a commitment is that a =
person=20
may prefer the libertarian ideal as an intellectual game, something to =
be merely=20
contemplated without relevance to the real world; another reason for =
weakening a=20
person's desire to pursue the goal of victory may be a profound =
pessimism that=20
he may feel about any future prospects for victory. In any case, holding =
the=20
victory of liberty as one's primary goal is only likely in those persons =
whose=20
libertarianism is motivated and molded by a passion for justice: by a=20
realization that statism is unjust, and by a desire to eliminate such =
glaring=20
injustice as swiftly as possible.
Hence, the utilitarian, who is concerned not for justice and moral =
principle=20
but only for increased productivity or efficiency, may believe in =
liberty as an=20
ideal, but is not likely to place passionate commitment into achieving =
it. The=20
utilitarian, by his nature, is far more likely to remain content with =
partial=20
success than to press on to complete victory. Indeed, such a weakening =
of the=20
will toward victory was partly responsible for the decline of classical=20
liberalism in the 19th century.
It necessarily follows, from our primary goal of victory, that we =
want=20
victory as quickly as possible. If victory is indeed our given end, an =
end given=20
to us by the requirements of justice, then we must strive to achieve =
that end as=20
rapidly as we can.
But this means that libertarians must not adopt gradualism as part of =
their=20
goal; they must wish to achieve liberty as early and as rapidly as =
possible.=20
Otherwise, they would be ratifying the continuation of injustice. They =
must be=20
"abolitionists."
The objection is often raised that abolitionism is "unrealistic," =
that=20
liberty (or any other radical social goal) can be achieved only =
gradually.=20
Whether or not this is true (and the existence of radical upheavals =
demonstrates=20
that such is not always the case), this common charge gravely confuses =
the realm=20
of principle with the realm of strategy. As I have written elsewhere,
by making such a charge they are hopelessly confusing the desired =
goal with=20
a strategic estimate of the probable outcome. In framing principle, it =
is of=20
the utmost importance not to mix in strategic estimates with the =
forging of=20
desired goals. First, one must formulate one's goals, which =E2=80=A6 =
would be the=20
instant abolition of slavery or whatever other statist oppression we =
are=20
considering. And we must first frame these goals without considering =
the=20
probability of attaining them. The libertarian goals are "realistic" =
in the=20
sense that they could be achieved if enough people agreed on their=20
desirability. =E2=80=A6
The "realism" of the goal can only be challenged by a critique of the =
goal=20
itself, not in the problem of how to attain it. Then, after we have =
decided on=20
the goal, we face the entirely separate strategic question of how to =
attain that=20
goal as rapidly as possible, how to build a movement to attain it, =
etc.
Thus, William Lloyd Garrison was not being "unrealistic" when, in the =
1830s,=20
he raised the glorious standard of immediate emancipation of the slaves. =
His=20
goal was the proper one, and his strategic realism came in the fact that =
he did=20
not expect his goal to be quickly reached. Or, as Garrison himself=20
distinguished,
Urge immediate abolition as earnestly as we may, it will, alas! be =
gradual=20
abolition in the end. We have never said that slavery would be =
overthrown by a=20
single blow; that it ought to be, we shall always contend. (The=20
Liberator, August 13, 1831)
From a strictly strategic point of view, it is also true that if the=20
adherents of the "pure" goal do not state that goal and hold it aloft, =
no one=20
will do so, and the goal therefore will never be attained. Furthermore, =
since=20
most people and most politicians will hold to the "middle" of whatever =
"road"=20
may be offered them, the "extremist," by constantly raising the ante, =
and by=20
holding the pure or "extreme" goal aloft, will move the extremes further =
over,=20
and will therefore pull the "middle" further over in his extreme =
direction.=20
Hence, raising the ante by pulling the middle further in his direction =
will, in=20
the ordinary pulling and hauling of the political process, accomplish =
more for=20
that goal, even in the day-by-day short run, than any opportunistic =
surrender of=20
the ultimate principle.
In her brilliant study of the strategy and tactics of the Garrison =
wing of=20
the abolitionist movement, Aileen Kraditor writes,
It follows, from the abolitionist's conception of his role in =
society, that=20
the goal for which he agitated was not likely to be immediately =
realizable.=20
Its realization must follow conversion of an enormous number of =
people, and=20
the struggle must take place in the face of the hostility that =
inevitably met=20
the agitator for an unpopular cause. =E2=80=A6 The abolitionists knew =
as well as their=20
later scholarly critics that immediate and unconditional emancipation =
could=20
not occur for a long time. But unlike those critics they were sure it =
would=20
never come unless it were agitated for during the long period in which =
it was=20
impracticable. =E2=80=A6
To have dropped the demand for immediate emancipation because it =
was=20
unrealizable at the time would have been to alter the nature of the =
change for=20
which the abolitionists were agitating. That is, even those who would =
have=20
gladly accepted gradual and conditional emancipation had to agitate =
for=20
immediate and unconditional abolition of slavery because that demand =
was=20
required by their goal of demonstrating to white Americans that =
Negroes were=20
their brothers. Once the nation had been converted on that point, =
conditions=20
and plans might have been made. =E2=80=A6
Their refusal to water down their "visionary" slogan was, in their =
eyes,=20
eminently practical, much more so than the course of the antislavery =
senators=20
and congressmen who often wrote letters to abolitionist leaders =
justifying=20
their adaptation of antislavery demands to what was attainable. The=20
abolitionist, while criticizing such compromises, would insist that =
his own=20
intransigence made favorable compromises possible. He might have =
stated his=20
position thus: If politics is the art of the possible, agitation is =
the art of=20
the desirable. The practice of each must be judged by criteria =
appropriate to=20
its goal. Agitation by the reformer or radical helps define one =
possible=20
policy as more desirable than another, and if skillful and =
uncompromising, the=20
agitation may help make the desirable possible. To criticize the =
agitator for=20
not trimming his demands to the immediately realizable =E2=80=94 that =
is, for not=20
acting as a politician, is to miss the point. The demand for a change =
that is=20
not politically possible does not stamp the agitator as unrealistic. =
For one=20
thing, it can be useful to the political bargainer; the more extreme =
demand of=20
the agitator makes the politician's demand seem acceptable and perhaps =
desirable in the sense that the adversary may prefer to give up half a =
loaf=20
rather than the whole. Also, the agitator helps define the value, the=20
principle, for which the politician bargains. The ethical values =
placed on=20
various possible political courses are put there partly by agitators =
working=20
on the public opinion that creates political possibilities (Means and =
Ends in=20
American Abolitionism, 1969; pp. 26-28).
If the primary and overriding goal of the libertarian movement must =
be the=20
victory of liberty as rapidly as possible, then the primary task of that =
movement must be to employ the most efficacious means to arrive =
at that=20
goal.
To be efficacious, to achieve the goal of liberty as quickly as =
possible, it=20
should be clear that the means must not contradict the ends. For =
if they=20
do, the ends are being obstructed instead of pursued as efficiently as =
possible.=20
For the libertarian, this means two things:
- that he must never deny or fail to uphold the ultimate goal of =
libertarian=20
victory; and
- that he must never use or advocate the use of unlibertarian means =
=E2=80=94 of=20
aggression against the persons or just property of others.
Thus, the libertarian must never, for the sake of alleged expediency, =
deny or=20
conceal his ultimate objective of complete liberty; and he must never =
aggress=20
against others in the search for a world of nonaggression. For example, =
the=20
Bolsheviks, before the revolution, financed themselves partially by =
armed=20
robbery in the name of "expropriating" capitalists; clearly, any use of=20
aggression against private property in order to finance the libertarian=20
movement, in addition to being immoral by libertarian principles, would =
cut=20
against those principles themselves and their ultimate attainment.
At this point, any radical movement for social change, =
including the=20
libertarian movement, has to face an important, realistic problem: in =
the real=20
world, the goal =E2=80=94 for the libertarian, the disappearance =
of the state and=20
its aggressive coercion =E2=80=94 unfortunately cannot be =
achieved overnight.=20
Since that is the case, what should be the position of the libertarian =
toward=20
"transition demands"; i.e., toward demands that would move toward =
liberty=20
without yet reaching the ultimate goal? Wouldn't such demands undercut =
the=20
ultimate goal of total liberty itself?
In our view, the proper solution to this problem is a "centrist" or=20
"movement-building" solution: namely, that it is legitimate and proper =
to=20
advocate transition demands as way stations along the road to victory,=20
provided that the ultimate goal of victory is always kept in mind =
and=20
held aloft. In this way, the ultimate goal is clear and not lost sight =
of, and=20
the pressure is kept on so that transitional or partial victories will =
feed on=20
themselves rather than appease or weaken the ultimate drive of the =
movement.=20
Thus, suppose that the libertarian movement adopts, as a transitional =
demand,=20
an across-the-board 50 percent cut in taxation. This must be done in =
such a way=20
as not to imply that a 51 percent cut would somehow be immoral or =
improper. In that way, the 5O percent cut would simply be an =
initial=20
demand rather than an ultimate goal in itself, which would only undercut =
the=20
libertarian goal of total abolition of taxation.
Similarly, if libertarians should ever call for reducing or =
abolishing taxes=20
in some particular area, that call must never be =
accompanied by=20
advocating the increase of taxation in some other area. Thus, we might =
well=20
conclude that the most tyrannical and destructive tax in the modern =
world is the=20
income tax, and therefore that first priority should be given to=20
abolishing that form of tax. But the call for drastic reduction or =
abolition of=20
the income tax must never be coupled with advocating a higher tax =
in some=20
other area (e.g., a sales tax), for that indeed would be employing a =
means=20
contradictory to the ultimate goal of tax abolition. Libertarians must, =
in=20
short, hack away at the state wherever and whenever they can, rolling =
back or=20
eliminating state activity in whatever area possible.
"Since most people and most politicians =
will hold=20
to the 'middle' of whatever 'road' may be offered them, the 'extremist,' =
will,=20
in the ordinary pulling and hauling of the political process, accomplish =
more,=20
even in the day-by-day short run, than any opportunistic surrender of =
the=20
ultimate principle."
As an example, during every recession, Keynesian liberals generally =
advocate=20
an income tax cut to stimulate consumer demand. Conservatives, on the =
other=20
hand, generally oppose such a tax cut as leading to higher government =
deficits.=20
The libertarian, in contrast, should always and everywhere support a tax =
cut as=20
a reduction in state robbery. Then, when the budget is discussed, =
the=20
libertarian should also support a reduction in government =
expenditures to=20
eliminate a deficit. The point is that the state must be opposed and =
whittled=20
down in every respect and at every point: in cutting taxes or in cutting =
government expenditures. To advocate raising taxes or to oppose cutting =
them in=20
order to balance the budget is to oppose and undercut the libertarian =
goal.
But while the ultimate goal of total liberty must always be upheld =
and the=20
state must be whittled down at every point, it is still proper, =
legitimate, and=20
necessary for a libertarian movement to adopt priorities, to =
agitate=20
against the state most particularly in those areas that are most =
important at=20
any given time. Thus, while the libertarian opposes both income and =
sales taxes,=20
it is both morally proper and strategically important to select, say, =
the income=20
tax as the more destructive of the two and to agitate more against that=20
particular tax. In short, the libertarian movement, like everyone else, =
faces a=20
scarcity of its own time, energy, and funds, and it must allocate these =
scarce=20
resources to their most important uses at any given time. Which =
particular=20
issues should receive priority depends on the specific conditions of =
time and=20
place.
Within any radical ideological movement for social change there are =
bound to=20
develop two broad and important "deviations" from the correct, centrist, =
movement-building position we have been discussing. At one pole is the =
deviation=20
of "left-sectarianism" and at the other the deviation of =
"right-opportunism."=20
Each, in its own way, abandons the hope of victory for the radical goal. =
The left-sectarian, in brief, considers any transition demands, any =
use of=20
strategic intelligence to determine priorities for agitation, any appeal =
to=20
one's audience without sacrificing ultimate principles, in themselves a=20
"sellout" or betrayal of radical principles. In the above example, a=20
left-sectarian, for example, would consider the transition call for =
repeal of=20
the income tax as per se a betrayal of the principle of the =
abolition of=20
taxation, even when that transition demand is clearly coupled with the =
ultimate=20
goal of a tax-free society. To take a deliberately ludicrous example, =
the=20
left-sectarian might consider not raising the problem of denationalizing =
lighthouses in our current society a betrayal of the principle of =
privatizing=20
lighthouses.
In the libertarian movement, sectarians will simply reiterate such =
formulas=20
as the nonaggression axiom, or A is A, or the need for self-esteem, =
without=20
grappling with detailed issues. The centrist position, in contrast, is =
to begin=20
agitation around currently important issues, examine them, show the =
public that=20
the cause of these problems is statism and that the solution is liberty, =
and=20
then try to widen the consciousness of one's listeners to show that all =
current=20
and even remote problems have the same political cause.
One form that left-sectarianism sometimes takes is that of advocating =
immediate armed revolution against the existing state, without =
sufficient=20
support to be able to succeed. In the modern libertarian movement, this=20
deviation was pervasive during its early stage, at the time of the New =
Left=20
"revolution" in the late 1960s and 1970.
The collapse of the latter "revolution" as soon as the state began =
its armed=20
counteraction at Kent State is testimony to one of the most important =
lessons of=20
history: that no armed revolution has ever succeeded in a country with =
free=20
elections. All the successful revolutions, from the American and the =
French in=20
the 18th century, to the Russian, Chinese, and Cuban in the 20th, =
occurred in=20
lands where free elections were either nonexistent or severely =
restricted. Until=20
or unless the United States changes from free elections to dictatorship, =
the=20
question of armed revolution is, at the very least, totally irrelevant =
to the=20
American scene.
In contrast to left-sectarianism, which spurns immediate gains toward =
the=20
ultimate goal, right-wing opportunists openly believe in hiding or =
working=20
against their ultimate goal in order to achieve short-run gains.
Right-wing opportunism is self-defeating for ultimate goals in =
several ways.=20
The major reason for putting forth transition demands is as a way =
station to=20
ultimate victory; but, by studiously avoiding the raising of ultimate =
goals or=20
principles, the opportunist, at best, short-circuits the ultimate goal, =
and=20
betrays it by failing to raise the consciousness of the public in the =
explicit=20
direction of the final goal. The ultimate goal will not be reached=20
automatically, by itself; it can only be reached if a large group of =
adherents=20
continues to hold high the banner of that ultimate, radical objective. =
"Until or unless the United States =
changes from=20
free elections to dictatorship, the question of armed revolution is, at =
the very=20
least, totally irrelevant to the American scene."
But, if libertarians refuse to examine and put forward their ultimate =
goals,=20
who will? The answer is no one, and therefore that objective will never =
be=20
obtained. Indeed, if libertarians fail to keep their ultimate objective =
in view,=20
they will themselves lose sight of the objective, and descend into =
another=20
gradualist, nonlibertarian reform movement, and the main purpose of =
having a=20
movement in the first place will be lost.
Secondly, opportunists often undercut the ultimate objective, and =
libertarian=20
principle as well, by openly advocating measures that undercut that =
principle =E2=80=94=20
such as a higher sales tax to replace an income tax (as did the =
Mid-Hudson=20
chapter of the Free Libertarian Party in early 1976), or a gradualist =
Four-Year=20
Plan to advertise their moderation and alleged reasonableness.
Even in the short run, opportunism is self-destructive. Any new =
ideological=20
movement or party, in order to acquire support =E2=80=94 as in the case =
of new products=20
or firms on the market =E2=80=94 must differentiate its product from its =
established=20
competitors. A libertarian party which, for example, sounds almost=20
indistinguishable from right-wing Republicanism (as did the Tuccille =
campaign=20
for New York governor in 1974), will fail if only because the voter =
presented=20
with no clear alternative will quite rationally remain with right-wing=20
Republicans.
In sum, both strategic deviations are fatal to the proper goal =
of the=20
victory of liberty as soon as it can be achieved =E2=80=94 =
left-sectarianism because it=20
in effect abandons victory, and right-opportunism because it in =
effect=20
abandons liberty. Both sides of this "equation" must be =
continually=20
upheld.
One curious propensity is that of a certain number of individuals, in =
the=20
libertarian and other radical movements, to shift rapidly from one =
diametrically=20
opposed deviation to the other, without ever passing through the =
correct,=20
centrist position. Apart from psychological instability among these =
individuals,=20
there is a certain logic to these seemingly bizarre leaps. Take, for =
example,=20
someone who for years confines his activities to stating pure principle, =
without=20
ever doing anything in the real world to change the situation for the =
better,=20
without trying to transform reality. After several years, discouragement =
at the=20
lack of progress may set in, after which, desperate for some =
gains in the=20
real world, the person leaps into right-opportunism =E2=80=94 and =
accomplishes little=20
there as well.
On the other hand, someone mired in short-run opportunism for years,=20
disgusted with the compromises and immorality of that form of =
politics,=20
can readily express his disgust and his yearning for pure principle by =
leaping=20
straight into sectarianism. In neither manifestation, however, is the =
individual=20
willing to engage in a protracted, lifelong commitment for victory in =
the real=20
world for principle and as quickly as the goal can be =
achieved.
I have touched on the concept of "cadre." Let us now consider the =
concept in=20
more detail; specifically, who makes up the cadre, how is it generated, =
and what=20
are the proper relations between cadre and various groups of =
noncadre?
The cadre are simply the consistent libertarians. In the first place, =
libertarianism is a set of ideas, and hence the original cadre =
are bound=20
to be largely intellectuals, people who are professional or =
semiprofessional=20
dealers in abstract ideas. Mises and Hayek have pointed out how ideas =
filter out=20
from original theoreticians to scholars and followers, to intellectuals =
as=20
dealers in general ideas, and then to the interested public. Thus the =
body of=20
intellectuals is of prime importance in influencing the general movement =
and,=20
ultimately, the general public.
It is to be hoped that the cadre begins as a tiny few and then grows =
in=20
quantity and impact. But what should be the proper relationship between =
cadre=20
and noncadre? First, we might put forward the concept of the "pyramid of =
ideology." For while "cadre" and "noncadre" may be a first approximation =
to the=20
real-world situation, the actual condition at any given time is akin to =
a=20
pyramid, with the cadre at the top of the ideological pyramid as the =
consistent=20
and uncompromising ideologists, and then with others at lower rungs, =
with=20
varying degrees of approximation to a consistent and comprehensive =
libertarian=20
vision. Since people usually become cadre by making their way up =
the=20
various steps or stages of the pyramid =E2=80=94 from totally =
nonlibertarian to=20
completely libertarian =E2=80=94 some rapidly, some slowly, this implies =
that the stages=20
will assume a pyramid form, with a smaller number of people at each =
higher=20
stage.
"If libertarians refuse to examine and =
put forward=20
their ultimate goals, who will?"
The major task of the cadre, then, is to try to get as many people as =
high up=20
the pyramid as possible. From this task, there follows the importance of =
ideological coalitions, of working with allies on various =
ideological=20
issues.
A coalition accomplishes several things. In the first place, it =
maximizes the=20
influence of the numerically small cadre on important social issues, and =
does so=20
by allying oneself with people who agree on that particular =
issue, albeit=20
on few others.
On which issues the cadre chooses to form alliances depends on =
a=20
judgment of importance in relation to the real-world context at the =
given time=20
and place. Thus, it would be an evident waste of time and energy for =
current=20
libertarians to find shipping interests with whom we could make a united =
front=20
agitation in the cause of denationalizing lighthouses. But coalition =
strategies=20
for abolishing OSHA or the income tax, or legalizing marijuana, or (in =
the late=20
1960s) pulling out of the Vietnam War or repealing the draft, might have =
a high=20
priority in the agitation of the libertarian movement.
While using coalitions with numerically larger allies on concrete =
issues, the=20
libertarian cadre is also pursuing another strategy =E2=80=94 recruiting =
more people.=20
These recruits can come from the allies themselves, or from the mass of =
the=20
public who are being informed about the specific issues. Normally, the =
proper=20
tactic will be to begin with the concerns of the people being =
worked on,=20
to show that you are with them on this particular issue, and then =
to=20
"widen their libertarian consciousness" by showing them that to be =
really=20
consistent on the issues they favor they must also adopt the other =
libertarian=20
positions.
Thus, while working with left-wing civil libertarians in support of =
commonly=20
held positions, it can be pointed out to them that libertarians are the =
only=20
consistent civil-liberties advocates, that personal freedom =
cannot exist=20
without private-property rights, etc. Similarly, conservative advocates =
of free=20
enterprise can be shown that outlawing pornography or drugs violates the =
very=20
system of private property and free enterprise that they profess =
to=20
favor.
Of course, there are pitfalls in a coalition strategy that must be =
guarded=20
against. In the late 1960s, I issued a call for a libertarian alliance =
with the=20
New Left, on the twin vital issues of the day: opposition to the draft =
and to=20
the Vietnam War (with subsidiary emphasis on opposition to the =
public-school=20
system.) I still think that this basic thrust was necessary =E2=80=94 =
especially to=20
generate a sharp and radical break with the conservative movement. But =
the=20
problem was that many of our young, tiny cadre, upon cooperating with =
the left,=20
became leftists, losing their libertarian grip.
The libertarian movement at that time had two grave weaknesses that =
left us=20
wide open for such defection:
- it was very small, and therefore had no self-conscious cadre, no =
organs of=20
opinion, no mutually reinforcing cadre to talk to and deal with, and =
- partly as a result of this tiny size, the libertarian movement of =
that day=20
had no activity with which to attract young and eager =
libertarians.=20
Many is the time when a new convert to the libertarian system would =
ask, OK,=20
now I'm a libertarian, what can I do about it? What =
activity can I=20
perform? There was no answer.
If a person was a budding young scholar, he could go to graduate =
school and=20
join the educational wings of the movement; but what if he was not? As a =
result,=20
the number of defections from cadre, not just to the New Left but out=20
altogether, were legion.
And this is one of the main reasons why the Libertarian Party has =
been such a=20
vital and important development in the last few years: It has given to =
eager=20
young (and older) libertarians a wide and open-ended field for =
continuing=20
energetic activity. In short, because of the LP, we have a =
genuine=20
movement rather than just a small group of thinkers and talkers =
(as=20
important as the latter functions may be).
This is also why it is very important to have "open centers" for =
libertarians=20
=E2=80=94 organizations for budding libertarians to visit and study, =
institutions that=20
demonstrate the existence of an organized ideology and movement. For I =
am=20
convinced that, for many reasons, including the libertarian heritage =
that is=20
partially imbibed by most Americans, there are many people who are=20
"instinctively" and inchoately libertarian and don't know it, and who =
need only=20
a few open reiterations of the pure radical creed to join up.
Finding the movement becomes extremely important for isolated =
actual=20
or potential cadre. In the late 1940s and for years afterwards, for =
example, FEE=20
provided the enormous service of being the only open center for =
laissez-faire in=20
existence, and I vividly remember the vital importance to me and other =
young=20
libertarians of discovering libertarian ideas and persons through =
FEE,=20
and the effect this stimulus and reinforcement had in radicalizing our =
own=20
positions.
One of the most important problems for any minority radical movement =
is the=20
question of long-run optimism or pessimism. Namely, while the short-run=20
prospects for victory may be nonexistent, does the movement believe =
that, in=20
the long run, it will win? In my "Left=20
and Right: The Prospects for Liberty," I pointed out that the =
conservative,=20
here and in Europe, is always a long-run pessimist. The conservative =
believes=20
that the inevitable march of history is against him:
"Even in the short run, opportunism is=20
self-destructive."
Hence, the inevitable trend runs toward left-wing statism at home =
and=20
communism abroad. It is this long-run despair that accounts for the=20
Conservative's rather bizarre short-run optimism; for since the =
long-run is=20
given up as hopeless, the Conservative feels that his only hope of =
success=20
rests in the current moment. In foreign affairs, this point of view =
leads the=20
Conservative to call for desperate showdowns with communism, for he =
feels that=20
the longer he waits the worse things will ineluctably become; at home, =
it=20
leads him to total concentration on the very next election, where he =
is always=20
hoping for victory and never achieving it. The quintessence of the =
Practical=20
Man, and beset by long-run despair, the Conservative refuses to think =
or plan=20
beyond the election.
That conservatism rarely attracts youth is explainable by Randolph =
Bourne's=20
incisive comment that
our elders are always optimistic in their views of the present, =
pessimistic=20
in their views of the future; youth is pessimistic toward the present =
and=20
gloriously hopeful for the future. And it is this hope which is the =
lever of=20
progress. =E2=80=A6
Furthermore, conservatism, with its attachment to the feudalistic,=20
theocratic, and militaristic Old Order, deserves to be =
pessimistic. Many=20
libertarians also have tended to be long-run pessimists, partly in =
imitation of=20
conservatism (with which some once were allied) but partly because it is =
easy to=20
be pessimistic in the 20th century if one focuses on the continuing =
advance of=20
state power. But to adopt this position is to fall prey to what the =
Marxists=20
call "impressionism," i.e., responding only to the journalistic, surface =
march=20
of events without analyzing the underlying laws and essences of the real =
world.
It should be obvious that long-run optimism is important for the =
success of=20
any radical movement. In the libertarian movement, pessimism has led =
either to=20
despair, dropping out, confinement of the ideology to an intellectual =
game, or=20
to the opportunistic hankering for short-run gains that leads to =
betrayal of=20
basic principle and that has governed the conservative movement; on the =
other=20
hand, long-run optimism leads both to a buoyant spirit and to the =
willingness to=20
engage in a protracted and determined struggle for ultimate goals.
All this is psychologically clear. But, if libertarianism is to be =
grounded=20
on a rational apprehension of reality, is long-run optimism the =
correct=20
stance to take, or is it only a psychological placebo?
It is my contention, which cannot be elaborated here, that =
libertarianism=20
will win, and therefore that long-run optimism is not only=20
psychologically exhilarating but also rationally correct. In my "Left =
and Right:=20
The Prospects for Liberty," I elaborated the basic reasons for this =
contention:=20
that, given the commitment by everyone, since the Industrial =
Revolution,=20
to industrialism and to mass consumption, the free market is the =
only=20
economy that enables the industrial system, along with above-subsistence =
living=20
standards for the growing mass of population, to survive and flourish. =
In short,=20
moral and economic truth is of course on our side; but, in addition to =
this=20
sometimes-not-very-comforting fact, freedom is necessary to the =
survival=20
and prosperity of the industrial world of the modern age.
"It can be pointed out to left-wing =
civil=20
libertarians that libertarians are the only consistent civil-liberties=20
advocates, that personal freedom cannot exist without private-property =
rights,=20
etc."
But this, of course, can still be very long-run, and might be =
cold=20
comfort to impatient spirits. In various writings since 1973=E2=80=9374, =
I have=20
concluded that Mises's long-run prediction of the "exhaustion of the =
reserve=20
fund" =E2=80=94 that the unfortunate consequences of government =
interventionism will one=20
day become glaringly evident =E2=80=94 has now come true. We have seen =
in the past few=20
years a host of crises: inflationary recession; the breakdown of =
Keynesianism;=20
crippling tax rates; the failures of Vietnam; the revelations about the =
CIA,=20
FBI, and Watergate; the crises in crime and the public schools; and much =
more.=20
At least in the United States, the objective conditions are now and will =
continue to exist for an accelerated leap forward in libertarianism and =
for a=20
rapid speeding-up of the "timetable" for victory.
I cannot believe that the visible great leap forward in the quantity =
and=20
quality of the libertarian movement since about 1973 is unrelated to =
this new,=20
continuing crisis of the American state. In short, the growth in the =
"subjective=20
conditions" for libertarian victory (the libertarian cadre and movement) =
is=20
partly a function of the objective breakdown of statism.
As the Marxists point out, pessimism stems from impressionism and the =
failure=20
to think dialectically. In short, in libertarian terms, while =
statism may=20
be marching onward, this march inevitably leads to a growing breakdown =
of=20
statism which in turn leads to a growing reaction in favor of=20
libertarianism and against the state.
The difference here between libertarians and Marxists stems from =
their=20
different theories. Thus, while the Marxists believe that capitalism =
will=20
founder on its "inevitable contradictions," giving rise to a proletarian =
movement for its eventual abolition, libertarianism holds that =
statism,=20
government interventionism, will founder on its inevitable=20
"contradictions," and that this breakdown will give rise to a =
libertarian=20
movement among the public for its eventual abolition =E2=80=94 and, =
further, if my=20
analysis of post-1973 is correct, that this breakdown of statism has =
already=20
begun.
"Conservative advocates of free =
enterprise can be=20
shown that outlawing pornography or drugs violates the very system of =
private=20
property and free enterprise that they profess to favor."
Libertarian victory is thus inevitable in the sense that =
objective=20
breakdowns of statism are bound to intensify, and also that such =
breakdowns will=20
tend to give impetus to the growth of libertarian ideas and =
activists;=20
but, with our belief in individual freedom of will, it is clear that the =
free=20
and voluntary adoption of libertarian ideas is not determined and =
therefore cannot be inevitable in the strict sense. But victory =
can be=20
achieved if the libertarian movement continues to increase in quantity =
and=20
quality, and if libertarians continue to learn about current political =
issues,=20
bringing their analysis to bear on problems that the American people =
face.
It is important for libertarians to realize that most people are, in =
normal=20
times, not interested in political affairs, and therefore willing =
to=20
continue passive or active support for the status quo. It is only the=20
development of "crisis situations" (like skyrocketing property taxes in=20
California), crises that result from the breakdown of the existing =
system and=20
with which the system cannot cope, that the radical movement can =
accelerate its=20
strength and possibly achieve victory (as it did in the case of =
Proposition 13=20
in California).
It is such periods of breakdown that stimulate a massive willingness =
among=20
the public to think deeply about the social system and to consider =
radical=20
alternatives. Such crisis situations might be economic ones (such as =
depression=20
or inflation or skyrocketing taxes), a losing or a stalemated war, or =
political=20
repression of free speech and activity, or any combination of these.
These crisis situations constitute the necessary "objective =
conditions" for a=20
successful radical triumph. In addition to these requisite objective =
conditions,=20
there are also the "subjective conditions" =E2=80=94 namely, a movement =
of sufficient=20
strength and influence to take advantage of these objective conditions:=20
specifically, to prepare in advance by predicting the crisis, to point =
out how=20
the crisis stems systematically from the political system and is =
not=20
simply a historical accident, and to point to the radical alternative by =
which=20
these crises and others like them can be surmounted.
The ruling elite of America and elsewhere is beginning to lose its=20
self-confidence, to suffer a decay of its will. And this indeed is =
another=20
condition of victory. As Lawrence Stone has pointed out in an analysis =
of the=20
failure of the ruling class,
The elite may lose its manipulative skill, or its military =
superiority, or=20
its self-confidence, or its cohesion; it may become estranged from the =
non-elite, or overwhelmed by a financial crisis; it may be =
incompetent, or=20
weak or brutal. (Causes of =
the English=20
Revolution, 1520=E2=80=931642, p. 9)
Thus, the objective conditions for the triumph of liberty have now, =
in the=20
past few years, arrived at last, at least in the United States. =
Furthermore the=20
nature of this systemic crisis is such that government is now perceived =
as the=20
culprit; it cannot be relieved except through a sharp turn toward =
liberty.=20
Therefore, what is basically needed now is the growth of the "subjective =
conditions," of libertarian ideas and particularly of a dedicated =
libertarian=20
movement to advance those ideas in the public forum.
Surely, it is no coincidence that it is precisely in these years, =
since 1971=20
and particularly since 1973, that these subjective conditions have made =
their=20
greatest strides in this century. For the breakdown of statism has =
undoubtedly=20
spurred many more people into becoming partial or full libertarians, and =
hence=20
the objective conditions help to generate the subjective ones. =
Furthermore, in=20
the United States at least, the splendid heritage of freedom and of =
libertarian=20
ideas, going back beyond revolutionary times, has never been fully lost. =
Present-day libertarians, therefore, have solid historical ground on =
which to=20
build.
The =
rapid growth=20
in these last years of libertarian ideas and movements has pervaded many =
fields=20
of scholarship (especially among younger scholars) and in the areas of=20
journalism, business, and politics. Because of the continuing objective=20
conditions, it seems clear that this eruption of libertarianism in many =
new and=20
unexpected places is an inevitably growing response to the perceived =
conditions=20
of objective reality. Given free will, no one can predict with certainty =
that=20
the growing libertarian mood in America will solidify in a brief period =
of time=20
and press forward without faltering to the success of the entire =
libertarian=20
program. But certainly, both theory and analysis of current historical=20
conditions lead to the conclusion that the current prospects for =
liberty, even=20
in the short run, are excellent indeed.
Murray N. Rothbard (1926=E2=80=931995) was dean of the Austrian =
School. He was an=20
economist, economic historian, and libertarian political philosopher. =
See Murray=20
N. Rothbard's article =
archives.
This article originally ran in the Libertarian Review, Vol. 7, =
no. 7=20
(August 1978), pp. 18=E2=80=9324, 34.
Comment=20
on the blog.
You can subscribe to future articles by Murray N. Rothbard via this =
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feed.