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Nixon's Second Term

The Sticks In The Closet

Nixon's second Administration has already taken a fascinating and rather remarkable new turn, a pattern that is consistent in all the major political arenas, foreign and domestic. So far not a single political observer has discerned this important new pattern, and little has been said about the second term except for a few references to personnel changes and some misleading remarks about Nixon's new budget. Yet the new pattern is a vital one, and may well set the political picture of the next four years.

In every major area, foreign and domestic, Mr. Nixon has suddenly and swiftly called a "truce", a major retreat from the overweening statism of his first administration. The truce is not only in Vietnam but everywhere; but, in every case, what we have is a truce rather than a genuine "peace". In the immortal words of Dr. George Shultz and Dr. John Dunlop, the administration is "keeping its stick in the closet", ready to be brandished over the head of recalcitrants. And yet, for the libertarian this is, after all, a major step forward; we would prefer to abolish the stick altogether, but it is far better to have it in the closet than in active and aggressive use.

Let us observe this "armed truce" or retreat in every major arena: among them, Vietnam, the draft, price-wage controls and, more loosely, the new budget.

Vietnam and Indo-China. In Vietnam, of course, we have the official truce or cease-fire. It is not to wash away the blood of millions of innocent Vietnamese victims on the Nixonian and American record to hail the cease-fire that has come at long last. We must credit Mr. Nixon for finally ending the fighting, for stopping the bombing, for pulling out American troops. The truce came far too late, but, Happy Day! it came. The U. S. will be murdering no more people in Vietnam.

What did the war in Vietnam accomplish? Nothing, if we compare, for example, the situation after the truce of 1973 with the truce of 1954. Nineteen years later, the Communists and their allies in the Vietnamese resistance are in far better shape, and control far more population and territory than they did after their misguided adherence to the Geneva Agreements, when they pulled all their troops out of the South. Betrayed after those agreements by the failure of the U. S. to conduct free elections, the resistance forces would of course never agree again to a unilateral disarmament and pullout of troops.

If the war was fought in vain, neither is the current cease-fire in very sturdy shape. Even the Nixon Administration has termed the truce "fragile", which is a hefty understatement. So while we hail the end of the fighting, we must remember that the American stick is very much in the closet: the task of the anti-war forces is to agitate to make sure that we don't pull the stick out once more and begin the tragic and bloody mass murder all over again. The stick is close by: American air power is near at hand, at bases in Thailand and elsewhere, our naval power is off the coast, and those old Kennedy-style "civilian advisers" are still there to support the Thieu dictatorship.

There will undoubtedly be plenty of temptation for the U. S. to use the stick, to send bombers and troops back into that unfortunate country. Thieu has made it crystal clear that he has no intention of arriving at a political settlement with the PRG (Provisional Revolutionary

Government), which means that no true peace in the area has been achieved. The political struggle of the civil war will continue, and could erupt at any moment into military conflict. In order to get the Americans out, the North Vietnamese and the PRG (to the probable unhappiness of the latter) made a remarkable concession: in contrast to every past war, when prisoners of both sides were exchanged at the end of the conflict, the North agreed to a unilateral release of American prisoners. This means that literally hundreds of thousands of Communists and other resisters will continue to rot in Thieu jails; and their fate remains fuzzy and unclear. The Thieu-Nixon excuse that these prisoners are not POW's but civilian dissenters because they didn't wear an official uniform is of course pure sophistry, and deliberately evades the very nature of guerrilla war, in which the civilians are the resistance forces. This truce, then, constitutes a monstrous injustice to the huge mass of prisoners of the Thieu dictatorship; and it is the big reservation that we must have to our joy over the end of the fighting.

The important point now is, that when and if armed civil war erupts again, whether over Thieu's prisoners or over any other issue, that the U. S. keep its hands off: that we at long last allow the Vietnamese to settle their quarrels themselves. We must see to it that Nixon never takes the stick out of the closet again, that he does not re-enter the war; to do that, it would help enormously if he pulled air, naval, and land forces fully and completely out of the entire Asia area.

The same, of course, applies to Laos and Cambodia, where the war continues. At this writing, a similar truce appears likely in Laos, where the Pathet Lao resistance forces are closely allied to Hanoi and may predictably bow to Hanoi's pressure. In Cambodia, however, the situation is different, and here we should call for immediate American withdrawal from propping up the Phnom Penh dictatorship. The point here is that the Cambodian resistance forces, the National United Front, are led, not by Communists but by the deposed ruler, Prince Sihanouk, who is not likely to bow to any Communist desire for a ceasefire. Furthermore, the Sihanouk forces are far closer to total victory than were the opposition in Laos or Vietnam. Only massive American aid is keeping the Lon Nol dictatorship in power in Phnom Penh and a few other outposts; the rest of the country is already in the hands of the Sihanouk forces.

The Draft. Nixon's partial retreat from statism in Vietnam is matched by his decision to end — or sort of end — the draft. This monstrous blot on American life is at last over, and no longer will every American boy and every family be trying to live their lives with the sword of Damocles of enslavement to kill or be killed hanging over their heads. Libertarians must rejoice at the Nixon decision to stop the draft at last — a decision, by the way, brought about largely by the pressure over the years of free-market economists demonstrating that the "shortage" of enlistees in the Army can easily be cured by paying the GI's market wage rates.

But once again, our joy at the Nixon decision must be qualified: the stick is in the closet but it is still alive. We have a "ceasefire" and not a "lasting peace." For the damnable machinery of the draft is still intact, ready to be used at a flip of the Presidential switch: and every American boy will still have to register at the age of 18, endure the dehumanizing in-

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dignities of the pre-induction physical, and receive his number on the roulette-wheel of the national lottery. Furthermore, the draft is not ended at all for the nation's physicians, who are still subject to the special penalties of the doctor draft. Libertarians should get behind the new bill of Senator Mark Hatfield to abolish the entire evil machinery of the draft: the registration, the draft cards, the whole shebang, lock, stock, and barrel. For Senator Hatfield's absolute firmness on the draft question, he can be forgiven much waffling on other issues.

And the stick is there in another sense: for President Nixon remains "hard nosed" on the amnesty question. The idea seems to be that American youth deserve some sort of "punishment" in the form of enslavement: and if they have managed to flee for their lives and avoid enslavement into the army, then at least they should be sent to jail (the conservative solution) or to compulsory bedpan service among the poor (the "Liberal" solution). Amnesty is not a question of whether "we" should mete out deserved punishment to draft evaders or deserters, or whether we should indulge in Christian forgiveness of crime. The draft itself is a supreme crime, and therefore draft evaders and deserters should be regarded not as criminals but as heroes, in precisely the same way as decent men regarded the slaves who ran away via the underground railroad. But the draft evaders and deserters disobeyed the law? Correct, and in precisely the same way as the slaves disobeyed the law; for let us never, never forget that slavery, until the 13th Amendment, was supremely legal.

The most puzzling and distressing aspect of the amnesty affair is the position of many so-called "libertarians" and alleged opponents of the draft who adopt the conservative view of upholding punishment for disobeying the law. Even when the law is enslavement! For some time I have wondered where many of our "libertarians" would have stood on the slavery question if this were 1858 instead of 1973. Would they really have been in favor of immediate and unconditional abolition? One wonders. Or would they have been griping about the slaves' "disobedience to law", of the necessity of their abiding by the Constitution and of accepting due punishment? Would they have warned that the slaves must not be freed until the masters were "compensated" for their loss of capital assets? Elementary linguistics would seem to place "liberty" and "slavery" at diametrically opposite poles; but considering the "law über alles" approach of many of our "libertarians", this question becomes a relevant and disturbing one. We have heard, for example, that Ayn Rand is opposed to amnesty, and that our supposed "first libertarian Congressman", Steven Symms, is against amnesty as well. Good Lord, it's enough to make a "LeFevrian" out of us all. Is our First Libertarian Congressman going to be less libertarian on this vital issue than Bella Abzug? Let it be said then loud and clear: THE libertarian position on amnesty is Unconditional Amnesty Now, for draft evaders, resisters, and deserters, with perhaps a parade and a brass band thrown into the bargain. And an apology for the law that forced them to flee.

Price-Wage Controls. On this issue, too, Mr. Nixon has inaugurated Phase 3, with the removal of direct price and wage controls on every area except food, health, and construction (where Nixon has installed permanent price and wage fixing machinery). Again: an action to be hailed; no single act is more destructive of a free economy than price-wage controls, and if we all denounced their imposition on the black day of August 15, 1971 as fascism then we must hail their removal as a major retreat from economic despotism. Once again, the market will be permitted to function.

Of course, the motives for Nixon's action do not seem to be the most noble. Price controls take some time for their flaws and distortions to develop: for the longer they last, the more do their controlled prices diverge from the prices that would be obtaining on the free market. The strains and distortions were beginning to develop by the end of 1972. They were aggravated by the continuing inflation and by the recovery from the 1969-71 recession both of which put on greater pressure for an increase in prices and costs. Furthermore, the potentially disastrous profit restriction on prices was beginning to have its effect. For Phase 2 had mandated that if a business firm were making high profits, it could not raise its price and could even be forced to lower it; whereas a firm making low profits would be allowed to raise prices. While the recession lasted and profits were low, the effective impact of these controls on the economy was negligible. But as profits began to increase upon recovery during

1972, business firms were increasingly feeling the pinch. More and more distortions were piling up, as "black markets" developed in wage controls by phony upgrading of jobs, and as businesses began to create inefficiencies in order to register lower profits. One firm was reported by the pro-control *Business Week* as deliberately encouraging larger expense accounts among executives, and as scheduling its annual stockholders' meeting for the first time in the Bahamas, because "if we have to be inefficient, we may as well enjoy ourselves." As these distortions piled up, the bulk of American business, which had previously supported controls as a way of keeping down union wage rates, began to shift their allegiance, and began to "rediscover" the merits of the free market.

In switching his position, then, Mr. Nixon knew on which side his bread was buttered. But at least he had the perception to realize what was going on, and to switch out of controls after only a year of Phase 2.

But of course, once again, we have only a truce and not genuine peace. It was for Phase 3 that the Administration coined its phrase about "the stick in the closet." The artificial and arbitrary price and wage "guidelines" are still there, and the Administration can be expected to try to intimidate business, especially large business and large unions, into obeying these "voluntary" yardsticks. Compulsion is available at any time for the Administration to use. So once again, we should not rest content until the entire control machinery is dismantled for good and all.

Mr. Nixon's recent proposal to dismantle farm price supports is another unexpected and welcome move in the same "ceasefire" pattern. Perhaps the imbecility of using controls to keep prices down while at the same time continuing to keep farm prices up began to impress itself on the Administration. At any rate, Nixon aims to phase out most farm price supports and acreage controls which cut food production — to the horror of the organized farm bloc. Even in Nixon's welcome proposal, however, he does not propose to go all the way, and there would still be provision for maximum acreage control if the government in its wisdom felt that production was likely to be "excessive." However, once again, Mr. Nixon has taken a decisive step to dismantle the farm price-raising program which has plagued this country since the days of Herbert Hoover (not Franklin Roosevelt, by the way.)

The Budget. A lot of nonsense has been written by supposedly astute political observers about the proposed Nixon budget. To talk of a "drastic revolution" in fiscal policy, of "stringent budget cutting", etc. is sheer nonsense. Orwellian "Newspeak" at its worst. In the old days, "cutting the budget" meant just that: reducing government expenditures. Now, Nixon is hailed/accused of being a "budget cutter" because he would increase the federal budget by "only" \$18 billion. What kind of a "cut" is that? Despite the "peace dividend" supposed to attend the end of the Vietnam War, military spending is granted a substantial increase. The idea, furthermore, that the government is "committed" to budget items in the future which cannot be removed is again nonsense; no Congress can legally commit a future Congress to anything. The fact that any program, once begun, becomes politically very difficult to remove, is of course true, but this is quite another story. These programs are not natural or divine disasters, like earthquakes not amenable to human interposition. What is required to remove them is political courage, a courage insured and fueled by political pressure from the aggrieved taxpayer.

With all this said, we must still hail the President for daring to call for outright removal of many "welfare" programs, including the racketeering Office of Economic Opportunity and other "anti-poverty" schemes. In this sense, the Nixon budget is a small step forward. It is an even bigger step if it means — which is not yet clear — that Nixon has abandoned his disastrous welfare "reform" plan and his burgeoning scheme for national health insurance. If he has, then his budget, coupled with the retreat on price controls, does constitute a significant partial retreat from domestic statism and a truce against its further advance.

All in all, then, the second Nixon Administration has very swiftly developed into a new form which is far more promising for libertarians than anything we might have dared to expect as late as last November. Your editor's judgment in finally landing on Nixon's side seems at this point to have been vindicated. In foreign policy, we are now in curious waters, in some senses in a world which we have not seen since the 1920's.

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Hospers Replies

It was something of a surprise to me that one of several dozen questionnaires which I rather hastily filled out during the recent presidential campaign (and not intended for publication) suddenly appeared in the *Libertarian Forum* (December 1972 issue), and even more that the remarks I made were taken out of context so as to produce a result very different from the one intended. I trust that the motive in doing this was something other than malice; but whatever the motive, I would like to clarify a few points with reference to that questionnaire, without attempting here to discuss the whole of it.

I have profited immensely from reading the *Libertarian Forum* during the last few years, and Dr. Rothbard's articles in particular have been unfailingly incisive, clear and informative, often more so than any other written material on the same subject anywhere. These pieces alone are worth many times the cost of subscription. In general, I agree completely with the articles on economic questions: in fact, many of them have helped to shape my own views on these issues. Virtually my only disagreements have been on one issue, international relations — and then only on some aspects of that. Our differing attitudes toward the police force probably result in large measure from our differing attitudes toward the current international scene.

That a police force of some kind is necessary, given the present state of society, seems obvious; that a private police force (or forces) would be ever so much more efficient than a state or municipal one seems also too plainly true to require much argument (though the questionnaire gave me no opportunity to indicate this: one was given space only to answer the specific questions asked, and no others). And among police forces in this country, my own dealings and those of everyone I know with the F. B. I. have been far more pleasant, or should I say less unpleasant, than with any local or state police force I have ever had dealings with (partly, no doubt, because of the superior training and education of the F. B. I.). Despite the fact that a national police force of any kind is always a great potential danger, I must admit that I would much rather deal with a member of the F. B. I. than with any local policeman I have ever encountered.

Now, unlike (apparently) the editors of this journal, I do believe that international threats to our security do exist — not merely threats to the United States government, but to the safety of individuals in the United States. I do not deny of course that the United States has committed its share of aggressions. (Let me state for the record that I denounced the involvement in Vietnam from its very beginning, though not so much because it constituted aggression by the U. S. when it was entered into as because the U. S. had no business becoming militarily involved in such overseas ventures.) But I also believe that the Soviet Union can hardly be construed as a peaceful and non-aggressive nation (I mean of course its leaders, not its people in general). In the Cuban crisis of 1962, for example, if the Soviet Union had had a 4-1 military lead over the United States instead of the other way round, it seems to me highly probable that Soviet bombs would have dropped on the United States. Except for American military might — which on other grounds is to be deplored, e.g. the advance of statism that usually accompanies militarism — it seems to me

extremely likely that attempts to Sovietize all or part of the world would have been made, and would have been successful. Most people did not believe Hitler when he announced his intentions in *Mein Kampf*, and most people have not believed the writers of the Russian revolution when they say (as the Communist Party theoretician Mikhail Suslov said not so long ago) that the present detente with the United States will be only temporary, and will last only until the Soviet Union gains a clearcut military superiority over the United States, at which time there will be "a renewed assault upon the West." And, to quote a historian whom no one who has read his works can call a militarist, an alarmist, or a far right extremist, Professor Carroll Quigley: "We do not know if the Kremlin is insatiable for conquest, as some 'experts' claim, or is only seeking buffer security zones, as other 'experts' believe, but it is clear that Soviet orders to advance were prevented by the American possession of the A-bomb after 1945. It does seem clear that ultimately Soviet forces would have taken all of Germany, much of the Balkans, probably Manchuria, and possibly other fringe areas across central Asia, including Iran. Such an advance of Soviet power to the Rhine, the Adriatic, and the Aegean would have been totally unacceptable to the United States; but, without the atom bomb, we could hardly have stopped it." (Carroll Quigley, *Tragedy and Hope: a History of the World in Our Time*, p. 864. New York: Macmillan, 1966.)

The *Libertarian Forum* apparently does not take such remarks seriously; it seems to be so concerned with fighting statism in this country that it prefers not to believe that there could be unpleasant, if not catastrophic, effects upon Americans of statism overseas; whereas I, while acutely aware of galloping statism in the United States (having spent most of my time in the recent presidential campaign attempting to fight it), am also worried about even more tyrannical statism overseas — not so much as it affects the Russian people (though that too is cause for distress), but as it could well affect the American people in the event that we choose to disarm at this critical juncture in history and thus lay ourselves open to any foreign aggressor that has a yen for Sovietizing the United States by force of arms or by ultimatums based on that force. (See Chapter 10 of my *Libertarianism*.)

It may be, of course, that certain side-effects of military preparedness in the United States — such as destroying American freedom in the very act of trying to preserve it against possible foreign attack — will be so ghastly as to outweigh the effects of preparedness against such aggression. It may also be (not that I necessarily think it is true, but only possible) that if the United States freed its economy by entirely disbanding the Departments of H. E. W., Agriculture, etc., and Defense, the resulting economic prosperity would be so tremendous that it would be worth running the risk of foreign aggression just to see it happen. But I would still be worried lest during the period of transition to a free economy, particularly with the cessation of "loans" of wheat and technological assistance to the Soviet Union, the Soviet Union would interpret this development as being so hostile to its interests that it would take advantage of our disarmament to take military action against us. At least, I do not see how the "disarmament now" libertarians can be so sure of the U. S. S. R.'s peaceful intentions that they would be (as they apparently are) content to risk the lives of millions of Americans by totally, or almost totally, dismantling its present military forces.

It is this difference in the estimate of the intentions of foreign nations that undoubtedly underlies the difference in attitude (between the *Libertarian Forum* and myself) toward the United States military and police apparatus. If military preparedness can deter potential aggressors (and admittedly it can also cause them to arm themselves faster), the result is surely well worth the cost. And if the F. B. I. or any other police organization can prevent the bombing of Grand Central Station by foreign or domestic saboteurs, by discovering the identity of the plotters and apprehending them in time to avert catastrophe, I for one am grateful for it, and consider the money spent on them more than justified by the dividends yielded in protection of life and property. If you and I are safer because these organizations exist, they are to that extent at least worth having around; that after all is what they are for, to protect us. I grant, of course, that they engage in other activities as well which are clearly not protective, and obviously I deplore those activities. The question is whether one should throw the baby out with the bath-water by eliminating at one stroke those organizations which do, at least sometimes, succeed

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For, with the truces in the Cold War which Nixon has in a sense concluded with Russia, China, and now in Vietnam, for the first time in a half-century our government is not holding up before our frightened eyes the spectre of a rampaging Enemy, just about to launch a dreaded attack upon American shores. Of course, the Cold War too is in the closet, ready to be trotted out again at any time that the Administration feels an acute need to conjure up a rampaging "Enemy" once more. But as of this moment, we are more at peace than we have been for a half-century. What will Mr. Nixon do with his all-round truce? Will he turn to something like the Eisenhower posture, and be content to snooze his way through the rest of his reign? Will we really be able to enjoy a relatively passive Administration for the next four years? Or will his restless nature lead Mr. Nixon into some new statist adventure, at home or abroad, to an arena where he can once again exert his potential power and might, where he can launch some new aggression? To paraphrase the old adage, we can hope for — and now even expect — the best, but we must be prepared for the worst.

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in protecting us against threats to our life and liberty from both foreign and domestic sources.

I for one am not prepared to take that risk. At the very least, the proposition that there is no such risk is in no way self-evident, nor is it so obvious as to leave no room for argument. But the attitude of some libertarians appears to be: "I'm so convinced that I'm right (about there being no foreign threats to our safety) that I'm willing to risk not only my life but yours, by disarming, on the assumption that my calculations are correct." Such a person is welcome to risk his own life on that assumption, but I don't want him to risk mine along with it. It is possible, as some libertarians have said, that the chief danger to your and my liberty in 1973 comes not from Brezhnev or Mao but from Richard Nixon; but that no threat arises from these foreign sources at all, in view of their explicitly stated intentions, seems to me so plainly false that only by putting on intellectual blinders and seeing only what one wants to see is one enabled to put forward such an assertion.

My neighbors Smith and Jones may be so anxious to buy a new car that they will spend their money on it rather than on guns or burglar alarms for their homes, rationalizing their action with the consoling thought that the man across the street who has been uttering threats and buying lots of guns will take their example to heart, scrap his guns, and desist from any aggression. But Latvians and Czechs will not be so easily persuaded; they will wisely conclude that it is better to live without the new car than to be in constant danger of being robbed or shot.

— John Hospers

The Editor Rebuts

First, I should like to make it clear, to Dr. Hospers and to his many admirers, that I have nothing but the greatest esteem for him, both as a friend and as the outstanding theorist and spokesman for the "limited archy" wing of the libertarian movement. I wrote the article to which he is objecting ("Hospers On Crime and the FBI", *Lib. Forum*, December 1972) not out of malice — but out of sadness, sadness at the numerous violations of libertarian principle committed by the Presidential candidate of the Libertarian Party in the questionnaire. I am firmly convinced, moreover, that the numerous flaws, fallacies, and inconsistencies in Dr. Hospers' general position stem not from personal eccentricities but from the very essence of his "conservative libertarian" position. Between Conservatism and Libertarianism there are numerous and grave inner contradictions, and the attempt to mix the two will lead inevitably to grave problems and anomalies, as we have all recently seen, for example, in Ayn Rand's attack upon amnesty for draft evaders. But since Dr. Hospers is a man of great rationality, objectivity, and dedication, I have every confidence that he will eventually embrace the truth and jump completely over the conservative wall.

Now as to specifics. Dr. Hospers states that the questionnaire was not intended for publication; yet when a presidential candidate, in the heat of his campaign, answers a questionnaire designed for all the candidates, this is surely and legitimately News, and publication of the results can scarcely be regarded as a breach of confidence. When one runs for the Presidency, and assumes an important role as spokesman for libertarianism, then one's utterances become especially subject to careful scrutiny. Hospers the presidential candidate of the Libertarian Party rather than Hospers the man was the subject of scrutiny in our article.

As for the "context", of course readers can only decide the merits of my summary by obtaining the questionnaire from the Friends of the FBI. But one notable fact is that Dr. Hospers makes not a single rebuttal to any of the points in my article nor an explanation of any of his answers. Instead, virtually his entire reply is devoted to the "Russian Question", a matter irrelevant and out of context if there ever were one. As I recall, there was not a single mention, either in the questionnaire or in Dr. Hospers' answers of the Russian Question, nor of course in my article. Indeed, what in the world the Russian Question has to do with whether or not the FBI should prosecute the drug traffic, or wiretap, or whether the police should remind accused persons of their constitutional rights, passeth understanding. Are we going to be like the typical Conservative, who drags in the Russian Threat like King Charles' Head to justify any and all acts of government tyranny? Once we go that route, once we begin

to justify a loss of liberty now in order to "defend" that liberty later, we are not only abandoning liberty itself: we are justifying every act of statism, from the draft to oil proration laws. Indeed, every such act has been justified by conservatives in the name of the Russian Threat and of national defense." And in these justifications, we can see how the State has for centuries used the "foreign threat" to aggrandize its power over its deluded subjects.

Before getting to the Russian Question itself, I would like to say that I fail to be impressed with the politeness of the FBI. That they are better than many local police is hardly a commendation; do we prefer Attila or Genghis Khan? In fact, on the score of education, intelligence, and suavity, the CIA has the FBI beat hollow; and yet the foul deeds of the CIA have become glaringly known. But the major point is the usual libertarian case for decentralization: that when we confront despotism by the FBI we have no place to go short of leaving the country; whereas to avoid despotism or brutality by, say, the West Waukegan police force all we have to do is to skip to East Waukegan: surely a far more comfortable choice.

But to get to the Russian Question. In the first place, whether or not Russia constitutes a critical military threat is strictly an empirical question, and therefore not a question that can be resolved in a few pages of philosophical or political controversy. For example, it is logically conceivable that Great Britain constitutes an imminent military threat to the U. S., and that Edward Heath is planning a sneak atomic attack on New York in 48 hours. Logically conceivable, but of course empirically laughable — even though we could make out a case of sorts, citing the fact that we were twice in grave military combat with Great Britain, and so on.

Since it is an empirical question, I will have to be a bit high-handed and say flatly that it is my considered view that there is not a single shred of evidence of any Russian aim or plan to launch a military attack upon the United States, either in the past, present, or future. In fact, the evidence is all the other way, even in the time of Lenin, and certainly in the time of Stalin and his successors. Since the time of Lenin and his magnificent (from a libertarian, pro-peace point of view) conclusion of the "appeasement" Treaty of Brest-Litovsk in 1918, the Soviet Union, vis a vis the other Great Powers, has consistently pursued a policy of what they have long termed "peaceful coexistence", in fact often bending over backwards to pursue a peaceful foreign policy almost to the point of national suicide. I am not maintaining that the motivation for this unswerving course was any sort of moral nobility; it is the supremely practical one of preserving the Soviet State at all costs to other aims and objectives, buttressed by the Soviets' firm Marxian conviction that, since capitalist states are doomed anyway, it is foolhardy in the extreme to court or risk war. The Soviet policy has always been the defensive one of hanging on to what they have and waiting for the supposedly inevitable Marxian revolutions in the other countries of the world. Lenin's adherence to that policy was only confirmed by the "socialism in one country" doctrine of Stalin and his successors.

We all too often forget several crucial facts of modern European history: and one is that, from the point of view of ordinary international relations, Russia (any Russia, not just Soviet Russia) was a grievous loser from the settlements imposed by World War I (Brest-Litovsk, Versailles). Any German, Russian, or Austrian regime would have been "revisionist" after the war, i.e. would have sought the restoration of the huge chunk of territory torn from them by the victorious powers. Old Czarist Russia was shorn of Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Western Byelorussia (grabbed by Poland after its war of aggression against Soviet Russia in 1920-21), and Western Ukraine (lopped off by Czechoslovakia and Rumania). Any Russian government would have hankered for its lost and grabbed territories. And yet, the Soviets did very little about this hankering; certainly they made no move whatsoever to make war to get the territories back. The Hitler-Stalin pact, much reviled by the uncomprehending Western press, actually made excellent sense for both major "revisionist" post-Versailles powers, Germany and Russia. For the essence of that pact was the commonality of revisionist interests by both powers: from that pact, Germany got its lost territories back (plus an extra chunk of ethnically Polish Poland), and Russia peacefully re-acquired its old territories, with the exception of Finland. No dire Russian military threat to the West, let alone the United States, can be conjured up out of that.

The next crucial and unfortunately forgotten fact is this: that Hitler

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turned brutally upon his ally and savagely attacked Soviet Russia on June 22, 1941. In this attack, Hitler was joined by the fascist regimes of Rumania and Hungary (Polish Poland and Czechoslovakia had by this time disappeared, or been swallowed up by Germany.) Why Hitler did this foolhardy act, an act that lost him the war and his head, is still a puzzle to historians. But we can say that his motives were compounded out of two factors: (a) his long-held desire to seize the "breadbasket" of the Ukraine; and (b) his hysterical anti-communism which fully matches the equivalent anti-Communism of the American Conservative movement. In his hysteria, Hitler too, like our conservatives, thought he saw an imminent Russian Threat: and so he decided on what is now called a "pre-emptive strike." But of course Hitler, like our American Conservatives, was deluded; for the events of the war revealed that Stalin's unwise trust in his ally led him to neglect elementary preparedness and thereby almost lost him the war as a result. Stalin's pacific policy was carried almost to the point of national suicide.

What of Stalin's "expansion" into Eastern Europe? This expansion was scarcely aggression in any rational sense: it was purely the inevitable consequence of Russia's rolling back and defeating the German aggressor and his Hungarian and Rumanian allies. It is only by a grievous "dropping of the context", of forgetting that Russia got into the war as a result of German aggression, that we can possibly point the finger of threat of "aggression" at Russia's military march into the aggressor countries.

As his evidence for alleged Soviet "orders to advance" into Western Europe at the end of the war, Dr. Hospers cites only a paragraph from Professor Carroll Quigley. Yet Professor Quigley is not in any sense a specialist on the history of the Cold War nor does he command any respect whatever in the historical profession. And with good reason. The only place I have ever seen Professor Quigley cited as an authority is in several Birchite tracts, tracts which, whatever their devotion to individual liberty, are scarcely noted for the profundity or the accuracy of their scholarship. If any readers are interested in the best scholarly evidence on Russia and the Cold War, let them turn to the excellent and notable researches of such distinguished historians as Gabriel Kolko, Lloyd Gardner, Walter LaFeber, and Gar Alperovitz, researches which back my interpretation to the hilt. I repeat: there is not a shred of evidence of any Soviet aim or plan, much less "orders", to invade Western Europe at the end of World War II or at any other time. If Dr. Hospers would care to cite some real evidence for his charge, I would be delighted to hear it.

In fact, read correctly, Professor Quigley's citation is simply one more of numerous indications that it was the United States that launched the Cold War, that it was the United States that brutally and immorally brandished its monopoly of atomic weapons in an attempt to cow Soviet Russia into getting out of the conquered territories of Eastern Europe and to open them to American influence and penetration. In fact, historians from such opposite ends of the political and ideological spectrum as Gar Alperovitz (in his great work, *Atomic Diplomacy*) and the late Harry Elmer Barnes, have shown that the very genocidal dropping of the A-bomb on an already vanquished Japan was done largely for the purpose of using atomic diplomacy as a counter in the American-launched Cold War.

As for the Cuban crisis of 1962, there is not a single piece of evidence of any Russian aim to drop missiles on the United States. In fact, the Soviets had plenty of their own missiles; and any idea that Cuba would launch a missile attack on the U. S. seems to me in the Great Britain-as-military threat category. In fact, the Soviet missiles in Cuba were as nothing to the missiles with which the United States had long encircled the Soviet Union. It is evident to me that the only possible purpose of Khrushchev's emplacement of missiles in Cuba was to safeguard Cuba against an American attack: an attack the prospect of which was scarcely ludicrous, considering the 1961 CIA attack on Cuba at the Bay of Pigs. As Richard Walton points out in his excellent recent book on the Cuban crisis, the cause and motive power of the crisis was President Kennedy's aggravated sense of *machismo*, his dangerous desire to face down the Russians in any sort of confrontation even at the risk of worldwide nuclear devastation. In fact, the Cuban settlement satisfied both parties: Kennedy looked like the macho conqueror, forcing the Russian missiles

out of Cuba; while Khrushchev gained the informal but vital concession from Kennedy that the U. S. would launch no further aggression upon Cuba. Unfortunately for Khrushchev, his Soviet colleagues did not appreciate the loss of macho face, and Khrushchev was deposed for his pains.

Dr. Hospers' only other piece of evidence is unsupported references to various Communist theoreticians, which he likens to Hitler's "announced intentions" in *Mein Kampf*. In the first place, as the eminent left-liberal English historians A. J. P. Taylor and Geoffrey Barraclough have pointed out, far too much has been made of the importance of *Mein Kampf* in assessing Hitler's policies. To say that someone's actions can be fully explained by a tract, written in very different circumstances a decade or more earlier, is highly simplistic as historical method. But more relevantly, Communist "announced intentions" are very different from those of *Mein Kampf*. The announced intentions of all the Marxist-Leninist theoreticians, from Lenin down to the present, are notably different: they call repeatedly and consistently for a policy of peaceful coexistence by Communist countries with the "capitalist" powers. There is never any equivocation about that. However, they do warn (to varying degrees, depending on the wing of Marxism-Leninism) that capitalism inevitably begets imperialism, and that imperialism will tend to launch a war against the Communist powers. Therefore, they call for alert preparedness and oppose any unilateral disarmament by the Communist powers. And given the black record of American aggression in the Cold War and elsewhere, I must say that they have a point: not in the inevitability of capitalism begetting imperialism, but in a wariness over the possibly aggressive intentions of American imperialism. In short, there is infinitely more evidence of an American military threat to Russia than vice versa; and the "announced intentions" of Marxism-Leninism confirm rather than rebut this conclusion.

In fact, after decades of study of Marxist-Leninist writings, I have found only one theorist who has ever advocated a Soviet attack on the United States: and that is the crazed Latin-American Trotskyite, Juan Posadas. But since Senor Posadas has no standing within the world Trotskyite movement, let alone among the Communists in power, I think we can safely assure Dr. Hospers that the Posadas threat is about as critical as our hypothetical threat from the armed might of Prime Minister Edward Heath.

Curiously, Dr. Hospers seems to be most worried about a Russian attack during the period of transition to a free economy, when the U. S. State shall have been abolished. How Russia could see this development as "hostile to its interests" is difficult to see; on the contrary, the Russians would breathe a sigh of relief at being free of the threat of American aggression, a threat which they have felt deeply ever since we intervened with troops and weapons to try to crush the Bolshevik Revolution in 1918-20. The Russians, indeed, have been anxious to conclude a joint disarmament agreement with the U. S., and have ever since they accepted the American proposal to that effect on May 10, 1955: a proposal which the U. S. itself promptly repudiated and has balked at ever since. Contrary to American propaganda, incidentally, the Russian proposal was for general and complete disarmament coupled with unlimited inspection; it was the United States who, while insisting on inspection, balked at any kind of effective disarmament.

To proceed to Dr. Hospers' final point: what of those Americans who are not persuaded by our evidence, and who persist in fearing the Russian Threat? He accuses us anarcho-capitalists who wish to dismantle the American State of "risking not only my life, but yours, by disarming". But the point is that, in an anarchist society, those who fear a foreign threat and wish to arm themselves defensively, are free to go ahead and do so. Dr. Hospers happily concedes that private police forces would be more efficient than the police force of government monopoly; so why not private defense forces or "armies" as well? Contrary to Dr. Hospers, anarchists do not propose to force those who wish to arm defensively to disarm: instead on the contrary it is he and other advocates of archy who are now forcing us to arm against a foreign threat that many of us believe does not exist. It is no more moral to tax someone to pay for one's own defense, whether real or imagined, than it is to draft him for the same purpose. And, besides, if the FBI is really protecting us against the sabotage of Grand Central Station, then why couldn't the owners of that station do a far better job?

The Old Curmudgeon As Hero

By Walter Block

Imagine, if you will, the problems of the real estate developer trying to supplant a whole city block of moldy decrepit tenements with a modern residential complex replete with gardens, swimming pools, balconies, and all the other accoutrements of fine living. Not so much all the government-made problems such as zoning laws, licensing requirements, bribes, permissions for architectural plans, etc.; to be sure, they are widespread, stultifying, and exasperating. Let us focus instead on the problems posed by the old curmudgeon who happens to live on the block in the most decrepit tenement of all. A building, however, that he is exceedingly fond of. Some might even go so far as to say overly fond of, since he refuses to sell the old homestead to the builder at any price. The builder offers hundreds, then thousands, and then even millions. But the old curmudgeon steadfastly refuses. The builder offers a paid trip to Europe, to Israel, to anywhere but to no avail.

As important as this instance may be, it is only one of the many cases where the old curmudgeon supposedly interferes with the well being of the multitudes. The old curmudgeon, who may be a little old lady, a wizened bitter old man, a great big fat jolly but stubborn person, has long been active, defending the old homestead against the inroads of highway builders, railroad magnates, mining companies, dam and irrigation control projects; indeed, we owe the plots of many of our Western movies to this theme. It is the old curmudgeon, or his spiritual soul mate, who served as the inspiration for the enactment of eminent domain legislation: a staunch human barrier to any and all progress, feet planted firmly at the crossroads, arms stubbornly crossed in front of chest, the motto of the old curmudgeon a strident, defiant "NO!"

So goes the popular view of the holdout. In this paper, however, I shall argue that the popular view is entirely mistaken; that on the contrary, it is the old curmudgeon, seemingly always standing in the way of progress, who actually stands for the greatest hope that progress has ever had: that this attack on the old curmudgeon who refuses to sell his property at the demand of some big builders is really a disguised attack on the concept of private property itself.

It is an attack on the basic concept of private property itself because according to that doctrine, each owner of property shall have the full right to decide its use, as long as this use does not interfere with every other property owner's similar and equal right to the use of his own property. In the case of eminent domain, when the state forces the property owner to give up the rights to his property on terms that he would not voluntarily accept, the rights to private property are abridged.

There are two main arguments for private property: the moral and the practical. According to the moral argument, each man is the complete owner of himself, to begin with. So the primary object of property rights, the person itself, is the foundation of property rights, from whence all other property rights flow. But the ownership and control of each person by himself ineluctably results in certain fruits of that ownership and control. These fruits of man's labor come under the ownership and control of each man in accordance with what he has produced, by the same principle under which he received ownership and control over his own body in the first place. The principle under which each person comes to control and own himself is the principle of homesteading, or of natural control or of natural regulation or of natural governance. That is to say, each person is the natural owner of himself because, in the nature of things, it is he, it is his will, that controls his body. Imagine if nature was different. If everytime I looked, you saw; if everytime I willed an arm to raise and scratch an ear, it was your arm that did so; if everytime you itched, I felt it. And if everytime you looked, I saw; if everytime you willed an arm to raise and scratch an ear, it was my arm that did so; if everytime I itched, you scratched. Then you would no longer own that body, and I would no longer own this one. Rather, you would own this one and I would own that one.

According to this principle of natural homesteading which justifies self ownership, man not only owns his own person, but he also owns the fruits of that person, that which he produces, those parts of nature hitherto unowned with which man mixes his labor and transforms into a more productive existence. The moral way that these non-human properties can change ownership is either through voluntary trade or voluntary gift giving. This is because these are the only ways of changing ownership which are consistent with the original owners natural homesteading

rights: they are the only methods by which the homesteaders maintain control even in giving up ownership rights, for they are the only methods by which ownership is given up on a voluntary basis.

The property now owned by the old curmudgeon was gained for him by just such a process. There was an original homesteader, there were sales of the land, perhaps the land was given in the form of a gift at one time or another. But the final result was that the land passed into the control of the old curmudgeon, if he is indeed the rightful owner, through an unbroken chain of voluntary events, all consistent with the principle of natural homesteading.

Any attempt to wrest it from him without his consent would therefore be in violation of the principle of natural homesteading and hence immoral. It would amount to an act of aggressive force against an entirely innocent party.

Many people realize this when it comes to resisting the demands on the part of a private business for condemnation of the old curmudgeon's property. They realize, perhaps, that one private business has no legitimacy over another. But when it comes to state condemnation, through eminent domain laws, the story is very different. Here, there is very little opposition, even though, in many if not all cases, there are still private interests, using the government's eminent domain powers to their own ends. Much of the urban relocation programs, for instance, are at the behest of private universities, of private hospitals. Much of the condemnation of private property by the government's use of eminent domain laws is done for the special interests of private lobbies and special interest groups. Done to benefit that part of the public that favors the aggrandizement of museums, parks, roads, public theatre, opera, and concert halls. The condemnation of the land now used for Lincoln Center for the Performing Arts in New York City is a case in point. A vast tract of land was condemned to make way for "culture". People were forced to sell at prices the government was willing to pay, involuntarily. Whose culture can be made perfectly clear by reading the list of subscribers to Lincoln Center, which reads like a who's who of the ruling class.

Now let us consider the second argument for private property rights: the practical argument. One practical argument for private property rights is that of stewardship; it is the claim that under the stewardship of private property, the "best" care will be given to the property of the older generation that is handed down to the younger, and that the younger generation will "best" be able to add to its heritage. According to the stewardship view of property, it is not terribly important just precisely who gets control of any given piece of property. What is important is that all property be privately owned, and that precise delineations between the property be clearly marked off.

According to the stewardship view, all property gets given out somehow (equally or unequally, it does not matter), no forced or involuntary transfer of the property is allowed, and each person works his property to the best or worst of his ability (it does not matter which). What does matter though, what is crucially important as a matter of fact, is that a market system be in operation so that those that "mishandle" their property eventually lose some of it and have less and less as time goes on, and that those who nurture and husband it well eventually gain some more and have more and more as time goes on. Thus, as these better able to maintain a good stewardship over property become responsible for more and more, and those unable to maintain a good stewardship have less and less, the general level of stewardship will rise, and better and better care will be taken of the property.

The way that the laissez faire market place works this out is simplicity itself. First of all, it defines the "proper maintenance" of property as that kind of maintenance or care-taking that maximizes the money return from or the value of that property. The market then tends to insure that the good caretakers earn more money than the bad ones. This enables the good caretakers, on net balance, to buy out the bad ones. For example, the "good" farmer, the one who maintains his crops and farm animals in good condition, will prosper, earn more money, and in the long run, tend to be able to either buy out the bad farmer, or to be able to bring more and more acres into cultivation. In any case, as time wears on, this stewardship system, in rewarding the good stewards, and penalizing the poor stewards, increases the average level of stewardship. And it does so

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automatically, without political votes every four years, without political purges, without fuss or fanfare.

Of course, this stewardship argument assumes a complete laissez-faire capitalist system. Any government infringements, such as loans and subsidies to prop up failing businesses (bad stewards who mismanage their property) such as the Lockheed loan, vitiate the whole effect. For then the mismanagers will not succumb to the more effective stewardship of the good managers. The government interposes itself between the bad caretaker and in effect, an outraged public, one that did not voluntarily choose to patronize the entrepreneur in question. Other forms such infringements can take are the granting of franchises, licenses and other types of monopoly advantages to one select individual, or group; the granting of tariffs and quotas to protect inefficient domestic "caretakers" against the competition of the more efficient foreign stewards; the awarding of government contracts which pervert the original consumption wishes of the public.

Why, it may be asked, if the goal of this practical argument for property rights is that it tends to promote good stewardship of the scarce resources of the planet, cannot the government help the process along a bit by transferring the control of resources from those who have proved themselves bad managers in the market to those who have proved themselves good managers? In this way, the vagaries of the market system will be suspended, and those who would eventually have been able to prosper in the ordinary course of events will be able to do so much more quickly. The problem with this, of course, is the insurmountable one that the market system works automatically day by day, to determine who are the good and bad managers each day. Past reputation and abilities count for nought. If the government attempts to hasten the process by transferring money from the poor to the rich, it will only succeed in transferring money from those who were poor managers in the past to those who were good managers in the past. (This is true on the assumption of a laissez faire society: of our own society, we can make no such claim. Practically none of the current income transfer from the poor to the rich occurs out of a motivation to encourage good stewardship nor has that effect.) There is no guarantee that the future will resemble the past. That those who were successful entrepreneurs in the past will be successful entrepreneurs in the future. Also, what of the people who are now poor but are destined by their own efforts to be very good managers and in the future become rich? A governmental program whose purpose was to spur on stewardship based on past accomplishments would involve taking money away from these future good managers.

The reason it is important to discuss this question is that it is at the root of the original problem of the old curmudgeon who refuses to sell his property. For what is the old curmudgeon who refuses to sell his property but a "backward", probably poor individual who is by all standards not a good manager? A prime candidate for being relieved of his money by a scheme whose goal is to speed up the market process of creating good stewards. But we have seen why this scheme is bound to fail. When we apply it to the case of the old curmudgeon we can see that not only does the free market have a tendency to reward good managers in the future, but that also, at any given time, there will tend to be a rough proportionality between the amount of private property amassed by an individual and the efficiency with which he cares for it. Of course there will be exceptions. Even assuming a laissez faire economy there will be some good managers with precious little to manage and some bad managers with an embarrassment of riches. But these will be the exceptions, not the rule. On the average in a laissez-faire economy, there will exist at any given time a rough proportionality between stewardship ability and the amount of private property amassed.

Therefore, stripping the old curmudgeon of his rightful possessions because of seemingly poor stewardship, in addition to being immoral, is even impractical from the point of view of the stewardship argument for private property. As small as it is, the old curmudgeon has demonstrated his ability to manage it, if for no other reason than that it is actually in his possession.

There is another practical argument for private property besides the stewardship argument. For want of a better name, we may call this the praxeological argument for private property. One complaint that the praxeologist would have about the stewardship argument would be that

such terms and phrases as "good maintenance", "the greatest good for the greatest number", "efficient stewardship", "proper handling of property", "maintaining property in good order", etc., have no precise definition; that the definition of "proper maintenance" of property in terms of maximizing the money return from or the value of that property begs the question of the perspective from which such evaluations are made. All too often, the praxeologist would charge, the implicit evaluation is made from the perspective of the large builder, and not from the perspective of the old curmudgeon.

The praxeological view focusses on the question of how to evaluate the level of satisfaction inherent in any business transaction or state of affairs. And the answer given is that the only scientific statement that can be made about such occurrences is that when a voluntary trade between two people takes place, both gain in the *ex ante* sense. The *ex ante* sense is the sense in which both parties to the trade, at the actual time of the trade, each value that which they gain from the trade at a higher level than that which they must give up in the trade. In the *ex ante* evaluation of the trade, it is therefore apodictically certain that both parties to the trade gain from it. We know this because the two parties would not have voluntarily agreed to make the trade unless, at the time of the trade, each had valued what he was to receive more than what he was to give up. Thus no one can ever make a mistake on a trade, in the *ex ante* sense. In the *ex post* sense of evaluation, which is usually contrasted with the *ex ante* sense, one can certainly make a mistake in trade. For the *ex post* sense evaluates the trade from the vantage point of the future. One most certainly can value what one receives in trade more than what one gives up — and then reverse one's evaluation in the future, when it is too late to call off the trade.

Returning to the case of the old curmudgeon who refuses to trade his old homestead even for a million dollars so that the big real estate developer can supplant the whole city block of tenements with a luxury complex. The praxeologist would vehemently reject the contention that

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Curmudgeon As Hero —

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there is any loss in welfare, stewardship of property, "proper" usage of property or whatever. For the praxeologist, as we have just seen, the only time that we can make a judgment about welfare, or good stewardship, etc., is when two people make a trade; and the only thing that we can say, as scientists, about the trade, is that both parties to it gain from it in the *ex ante* sense (or else they would not have voluntarily entered into the trade). But the case of the old curmudgeon refusing to sell his homestead for a million is precisely not a case where two parties enter voluntarily into a trade. It is precisely a case where no trade takes place. We cannot therefore deduce that welfare or good stewardship was thwarted. If anything, the only thing that we can deduce from the failure of the trade to take place is that although perhaps the real estate developer valued the old homestead more than the million dollars he was willing to give up for it, the old curmudgeon decidedly did not so value these two properties. On the contrary, from his failure to sell, we can only conclude that he valued the old homestead more than the million dollars. And who is to say him nay? Since no interpersonal comparisons of utility or welfare can have a scientific basis (there is no unit by which such things can even be measured, let alone compared between different people) there is no one who can legitimately say that the refusal of the old curmudgeon to sell his property is "harmful", or causes problems, or is "obstructive". Of course the old curmudgeon's choice is obstructive of the real estate developer's goals. But then, the goals of the real estate developer are just as obstructive of the goals of the old curmudgeon. There is no scientific, let alone moral, reason to regard the curmudgeon's goals and values as inferior to those of the developer. □

A Libertarian Poll

Mr. Ferdinand V. Solara, an inveterate chronicler of things libertarian and conservative, has just released the results of a questionnaire polling the intensity of the respondents' devotion to various libertarian individuals, publications, and organizations. It is scarcely Mr. Solara's fault that the representativeness of his sample can be questioned; 155 answers are not a large sample of the movement, and perhaps his Colorado base helps account for the high percentage of objectivists and other "limited archists" among his respondents (approximately ¾ of those answering were limited archists and ¼ anarchists.) Perhaps Colorado also accounts for the fact that 60% of the pollees were Libertarian Party members.

Mr. Solara asked his respondents to rate various magazines and organizations on a scale ranging from A to E. One interesting result is the picture of the intensity of devotion of members or subscribers, gauged from how many gave an "A" rating to "their" groups or journals. Of

the organizations, there was generally a near 1:1 correlation between members and an "A" rating: that is, the two were roughly equal. One major anomaly is the Liberty Amendment Committee, which had only 4 members but which garnered an "A" rating from 24 respondents; this indicates that many people esteem the Liberty Amendment Committee who wouldn't dream of joining the organization. On the other hand, the other leading anomaly was our old friend YAF, which had 29 members among those polled, but which only got an A from 2 of them. There are presumably a great many disaffected members of YAF, as well there might be.

Of the publications listed, we are happy to announce that a close A/subscriber correlation held true for only three journals: *Reason*, *A is A News*, and the *Lib. Forum*. All the other listed magazines revealed a severe falling off of ratings, presumably reflecting a severe disaffection among their subscribers. There is, however, an anomaly in regard to the *Lib. Forum*. That is, that while we have developed a high degree of subscriber loyalty, our number of subscribers among the pollees was relatively small, far smaller than several of our colleagues in dire loyalty trouble. In short, folks, we have a great product, but not enough readers imbibing all the goodies we have to offer. Let us remedy that, and round up more subscribers! Why deprive so many people of the blessings conferred by the *Libertarian Forum*? □

Movement Magazines

Manny Klausner, the estimable young editor of *Reason*, chides us for our gloomy account of the stillbirth of *Libertarian Review*, (*Lib. Forum*, December 1972) and wishes to correct the record by pointing out that the monthly *Reason* now has over 5,000 subscribers and bids fair to rise to over 6,000 in a short time. Well taken, but I doubt whether this happy news is enough to cut the gloom about the current good health of the libertarian movement. For, on the other hand, we must consider that no less than three of our leading libertarian magazines have bit the dust in recent months, and a fourth is at least in serious trouble. *The Individualist*, formerly a fine monthly magazine issued under the auspices of the Society for Individual Liberty, has apparently expired. *Libertarian Analysis*, a quarterly journal that tried to be a home for scholarly articles, is dead. And *The New Banner*, an ambitious tabloid biweekly of high quality produced by the South Carolina movement, has apparently collapsed as well. And now *Outlook*, an organ of much of the New York movement which had achieved a high quality in recent issues, is, if not expired, at least in the throes of a bitter internecine conflict. It looks as if there is a good chance that we will soon be left with *Reason* as virtually our only magazine. Despite the many fine qualities of *Reason*, this means that the fortunes of the movement are in worse shape than we wrote last December, rather than better; apart from *Reason*, the libertarian publishing world is in a shambles. □

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