For A New Isolationism by Murray N. Rothbard

For A New = Isolationism=20

by Murray=20 N. Rothbard
by Murray = N.=20 Rothbard

[This item in the = Rothbard=20 Papers bears the notation: "Written April 1959. Sent to = National=20 Review."]

It=20 is with a heavy heart that I enter the lists against the=20 overwhelming majority of my friends and compatriots on the = Right;=20 also with a sense of futility in trying to combat that tough = anti-Soviet foreign policy to which the Right is perhaps = even more=20 dedicated than it is to anti-Socialism. But I must try, if = only for=20 the reason that no one else has done so (if, indeed, = there=20 are any outright isolationists left anymore).

To=20 begin with, I wish to put my argument purely on the grounds = of=20 American national interest. I take it for granted that there = are=20 few, if any, world-savers on the Right of the Wilson-FDR = stamp, who=20 believe in the moral obligation of the American government = to=20 enforce "collective security" all over the world, and to = make sure=20 that global Ruritania has no government which we do not = like. I=20 assume that the reason that the Right favors a "tough" = foreign=20 policy against the Soviet bloc, is that it believes that = only such a=20 policy will secure and promote, American national interests. = And=20 this is the argument which, I maintain, is open to serious=20 challenge.

There is, in the = first place,=20 an obviously serious omission in the arguments of the = partisans of a=20 policy of "liberation," who constantly denounce the doctrine = of mere=20 "containment" to which the Administration, both Democratic = and=20 Republican, has been roughly committed for over a decade. In = opposition, the Right talks grandiosely but very vaguely = about=20 "ultimatums" on Quemoy, Berlin or any other issue that comes = up; but=20 precisely what it really has to offer as a positive = program=20 is never mentioned. In all the reams of material written by = the=20 Right in the last decade, there is never any precise = spelling-out of=20 what a policy of ultrafirmness or toughness really entails.=20

Let=20 us then fill in this gap by considering what I am sure we = would all=20 agree is the toughest possible policy: an immediate = American=20 ultimatum to Khruschev and Co. to resign and disband the = whole=20 Communist regime; otherwise we drop the H-bomb on the = Kremlin. What=20 about this policy of maximum toughness, which would = certainly=20 accomplish one thing: it would bring about a quick showdown = between=20 East and West? What is wrong with this policy? Simply that = it would=20 quickly precipitate an H-bomb, bacteriological, chemical, = global war=20 which would destroy the United States as well as Russia. = Now, it is=20 true that perhaps this would not happen. Indeed, if we = accept the=20 favorite Right-wing credo that the Soviet leaders will = always=20 back down before any of our ultimatums, and will never fight = if we=20 are only tough enough, then maybe it is true that the = Communist=20 leaders will quickly surrender, perhaps on promise of asylum = on some=20 remote Elba. But are you, Mr. Right Winger, willing to take = this=20 risk? It seems to me that this is the only logical = conclusion of the=20 vague talk of toughness that we have adopted for so long. As = for me,=20 it seems clear that, since it is almost certain that the = destruction=20 of the United States would follow such an ultimatum, we must = strongly oppose such a policy. The fact that Russia would = also be=20 destroyed in the holocaust would be cold comfort to someone = who=20 holds the national interest of the United States uppermost.=20

But=20 if we concede that this ultimate and decisive ultimatum must = be=20 rejected, then, I contend, we must revise our views on = foreign=20 policy as a whole. Perhaps then we should think twice about = sending=20 ultimatums about Berlin, Quemoy, or the countless other = trouble=20 spots which are bound to erupt in an unending series of = crises, so=20 long as we continue the policy of the cold war. If we are = not=20 prepared to go the whole way in a program of liberation, = then it=20 makes little sense and creates great risks to keep inching = forward=20 part of the way, each time proclaiming our supposed = certainty that=20 Russia will not fight.

What, then, of the = old policy=20 of containment, which is the only logical alternative to = all-out=20 liberation that has been offered? We have so far been more = or less=20 containing for over ten years, seemingly doomed forever to = huge and=20 crippling armament budgets, an unending chase-your-tail arms = race=20 with periodic cries of alarm about the "crisis year" coming = up when=20 Russia will be ahead of us in something or other, and an = eternal=20 series of hot-spot crises each of which may touch off a = global=20 holocaust. In short, we are sitting on top of an ever-more = menacing=20 powder keg. We have all tended to forget the basic rationale = of=20 containment as expounded by George Kennan when he was "Mr. = X." That=20 is, that time will bring either a revolution inside Russia, = or a=20 "mellowing" of Soviet power; at any rate, that with a little = time,=20 the Soviet menace to the United States would dissolve. =

As=20 for the "mellowing," some of us had high hopes after the = famous=20 Khruschev speech of 1956. For here, for the first time, the=20 Communists were denouncing their own hallowed leader, = Stalin. Yet,=20 it is certainly clear by now that no mellowing is in the = offing;=20 that the Communist Parties, far from shaken, have absorbed = this=20 shift in line as they have absorbed so many others, and that = the=20 so-called "liberal" Communism of the Gomulka stripe is just = the same=20 old totalitarianism in another guise. The failure of the = Communist=20 regime to crumble after the anti-Stalin shift should be a = lesson to=20 all of us proving that people in power never voluntarily = give it up;=20 that they must be blasted loose. In short, the Marxists are = right=20 when they say that the "ruling class" (in this case, the = Communists=20 in Russia) will never relinquish power voluntarily. =

The=20 only way for the Communist regime to crumble from within, = therefore,=20 is by internal revolution. Now I know that Mr. Eugene Lyons = has been=20 valiantly predicting for many years now an imminent = revolution=20 inside the Soviet Union. I fervently hope that he is right. = But to=20 base a foreign policy on expectation of revolution seems to = me=20 foolhardy. The Soviet regime has been in power, after = all,=20 for some forty-two years, and unfortunately, there are = still=20 no signs of revolution on the horizon. Don=92t = misunderstand me:=20 we must all hope and pray for such a revolution, but we = cannot count=20 on its arrival. The present regime seems more stable than = any since=20 Stalin=92s death.

If=20 neither liberation nor containment is sensible, what is the=20 alternative? Simply a genuine policy of peace, or, what is = the same=20 thing, a return to the ancient and traditional American = policy of=20 isolationism and neutrality. This is a policy which I think = the=20 Right should understand, in view of the Right=92s gallant = fight=20 against the disastrous Roosevelt maneuvering of the United = States=20 into World War II. This means total disengagement in Europe = and=20 Asia, "bringing the boys back home," and all the other = aspects of=20 that policy of sturdy neutrality which used to be = America=92s pride.=20

But,=20 I will hear from every side, everyone knows that = isolationism is=20 obsolete and dead, in this age of H-bombs, guided missiles, = etc. But=20 is it really? It is my contention that our national interest = calls=20 for the following policy: a program of world disarmament = up to=20 the point where isolationism again becomes militarily = practical.=20 Specifically, America is threatened now in a way in = which it=20 was not threatened a generation ago: by those weapons, = H-bomb=20 missiles, disease germs, chemical gases, which can span the = old=20 blessed protection of the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. We = are=20 not threatened by Russian tanks or machine guns or = infantry.=20 It is, therefore, the principal task of an American foreign = policy=20 truly devoted to American interests, to bring about a = universal=20 scuttling of the new weapons. If we all returned to no more = than the=20 old "conventional" weapons, and preferably even to the = muskets of=20 yore, then America would no longer be endangered. = This does=20 not mean, of course, that America should unilaterally = disarm. But it=20 does mean that America should try its best to effect = a=20 disarmament-agreement with Soviet Russia, whereby all the = nuclear=20 etc. weapons that could injure us would be dismantled. = Khrushchev=92s=20 speech at the United Nations should not be arrogantly = ignored.=20

I=20 have no fears that a workable inspection agreement cannot be = hammered out, if our leaders only have the will that they = have so=20 far lacked. In fact, the quite obvious fears of = Right-wingers that=20 Russia will consent to a viable disarmament program, = shows=20 that they agree with me that the Russians are truly = sincere=20 in wanting nuclear disarmament. They are sincere, of course, = not=20 because the Communist leaders are altruists or = humanitarians; but=20 simply because it is also to their best interests to adopt = nuclear=20 disarmament.

Here, the = Right-winger will=20 stop short and say: Aha, how can a policy be both to the = Communist=20 interests and to ours? Simply because neither side should = want to be=20 destroyed, and therefore each side will gain by the mutual = disarming=20 of the only weapons (nuclear, etc.) by which each can be = mortally=20 hurt. Secondly, mutual nuclear disarmament will certainly = leave the=20 Soviet Union in a military advantage vis-=E0-vis its = neighbors:=20 since it will have the preponderance of conventional arms. = Here, the=20 Right-winger thinks he really has me. Isn=92t the fact that = Russia=20 will gain a great arms advantage by nuclear disarmament a = clear=20 proof that this policy is unwise?

In=20 the first place, I do not think it at all obvious that = Russia will=20 immediately attack the other nations. Believing as it does = in=20 eventual internal Communist triumph and fearing an American = return=20 to a cold-war policy, it will most likely refrain from any = military=20 attack. And, secondly, we can relieve ourselves of even more = of the=20 crippling and wasteful economic burden of armaments, as well = as take=20 the unilateral propaganda play for peace away from the = Russians for=20 a change, by suggesting to them further disarmament of even=20 conventional weapons, perhaps eventually stripping down = completely=20 to bows and arrows. But let US assume the worst, and suppose = that=20 the Russians will really proceed to attack their neighbors = with=20 conventional arms once nuclear disarmament has been = attained. What=20 then?

I=20 maintain that the only answer we can give to this = hypothetical=20 problem is the inelegant: "so what"? Let us not forget our = initial=20 axiom: that we first and foremost pursue American national=20 interests. In that case, while we would personally deplore a = Communist takeover of foreign countries, we would also = adhere to the=20 old isolationist principle of doing nothing about it, = because it=20 would not be of official national concern. Deprived of = nuclear, etc.=20 arms, Russia might be a military menace to Europe or the = Middle=20 East, but it would no longer be a menace to the United = States, our=20 primary concern. The Russian and Chinese hordes will not be = able to=20 swim the oceans to attack us.

At=20 this point, my opponents are sure to trot out that old saw = which was=20 used so effectively by interventionists who sobbed about the = terrible world that would ensue if Hitler won the war in = Europe:=20 perhaps we would not be militarily in danger, the slogan = runs, but=20 then America would be an island, forced to a heavy arms = budget, and=20 not able to trade with the hostile rest-of-the-world. In the = first=20 place, this argument, never very sensible, is absurd today = when we=20 are groaning under the fantastic budgets imposed by our = nuclear arms=20 race. Certainly, our arms budget will be less than it is = now,=20 especially since it would take far less to protect us from = military=20 attack. And we could, as I have said, propose further and=20 progressive disarmament.

We=20 are left with the argument about trade. This strikes one of = the=20 oddest notes of all, coming as it does from the very same = people who=20 are now fiercely opposed to any current trade with the = Communist=20 countries. The basis of all trade is benefit to both = parties.=20 There is no need for the traders to like each other for each = to gain=20 by the trade. There is no reason, therefore, why the = Communists,=20 even if in charge of most of the world, would not be willing = to=20 trade with us, just as they are willing and eager to trade = now.=20

A=20 return to old-fashioned isolationism, then, is = paradoxically=20 the only really practical foreign policy that we have. It is = precisely because we are living in the terrible technology = of the=20 nuclear age that we have a sound basis for a workable = disarmament=20 agreement with the Russians. And, with such an agreement, we = would=20 be back to the military realities of the pre-nuclear age = when even=20 our present Right-wing interventionists agreed that = isolationism=20 was practical.

One=20 thing I would like to make quite clear: I am not = proposing a=20 program of large-scale foreign aid to the Soviet government, = or a=20 joint UN slush fund for the backward nations. In fact, = adoption of a=20 true isolationist program would finally end, once and for = all, the=20 blackmail wheedling of foreign countries that they will go = Communist=20 if we don=92t come across with a suitable bribe. We can now = tell the=20 foreign nations to paddle their own canoes at last, and take = full=20 responsibility for their own actions.

There is, in short, = an=20 eminently sound alternative to the loudly trumpeted policies = of=20 either pro-Soviet or anti-Soviet interventionism. And that = is a new=20 policy of enlightened and realistic isolationism, sparked, = as it=20 needs to be in our day, by general nuclear disarmament of = the world=20 powers. Abandoning foreign meddling, we need neither = continue the=20 cold war nor pretend that the Communist leaders are our = "heroic=20 allies." We need only adopt again that stance of splendid = isolation=20 which once made peaceful and free America the beacon-light = of the=20 world.

Postscript. As = Rothbard=20 might have expected, National Review did not wish to = re-open=20 debate on the fundamentals of foreign policy. Rothbard = expressed his=20 reaction in a letter of May 19, 1959, to a colleague: =

"=85 I=20 thought you might be interested in the enclosed article, = =91For a New=20 Isolationism,=92 which was, predictably, turned down by Bill = Buckley.=20 (Bill loftily though in friendly fashion declared that I = should have=20 refuted Burnham, W. H. Chamberlin, and Janeway; I think I = did=20 anyway, but even if I had specifically dealt with them, it = is clear=20 Bill would not have published it.) In this article, I = don=92t at all=20 deal with the moral-libertarian reasons for pure = isolationism such=20 as I had treated in the 1954 Faith and Freedom symposium, = but solely=20 on the grounds of =91national interest=92 [thereby meeting] = the=20 Right-wingers on their own terms, with their own weapons.=20

"I=20 can think of no other magazine which might publish this, = though I=20 might fix it up a bit and try one of the leftist-pacifist=20 publications. The thing is that I am getting more and more = convinced=20 that the war-peace question is the key to the whole=20 libertarian business, and that we will never get anywhere in = this=20 great intellectual counter-revolution (or revolution) unless = we can=20 end this Verdamte cold war =96 a war for which I believe our = =91tough=92=20 policy is largely responsible. Suppose, for example, that an = enormously unlikely thing would happen and Nixon would (a) = become=20 converted to purism, and (b) would be elected President. As = long as=20 the cold war continued, and we had a $40 billion or more = arms=20 budget, what good would it really do? The fact that we might = spend a=20 few billion less on public housing or on farm support no = longer=20 thrills me. Nothing will mean much without a radical = dismantling of=20 the State apparatus, and this cannot occur without radical=20 disarmament, and an end to the cold war policy;

"I=20 think that, when I get some spare time, I will write a = little book=20 on this war-peace question, incorporating moral-libertarian = and=20 realist-national defense arguments, to work out a theory of=20 isolationism. I know that this will make me highly unpopular = on the=20 Right without increasing my rating on the Left, but this is = a job I=20 am convinced has to be done, and it looks as if I=92ll have = to do it,=20 precisely because nobody else is. As grand old Tom Barber = said years=20 ago, in the forward of his libertarian book: =91It will be = asked: Who=20 is the author?=85 Why should he undertake to write such a = book? The=20 answers are quite simple. I have written this book because I = felt it=20 should be written for the benefit of the United States, and = because=20 I am the only person I have available to write it.=92" =85. = "Cordially,=20 Murray"

~ Joseph=20 Stromberg, Rothbard Archivist

Murray N. Rothbard = (1926=961995), the founder of modern libertarianism and the = dean of=20 the Austrian School of economics, was the author of T= he=20 Ethics of Liberty and For=20 a New Liberty and many other books = and=20 articles. He was also academic vice president of the = Ludwig von=20 Mises Institute and the Center for Libertarian Studies, and = the=20 editor =96 with Lew Rockwell =96 of The=20 Rothbard-Rockwell Report.

Murray=20 Rothbard Archives

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